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J IMMY CARTER, BILL CLINTON, AND
THE NEW DEMOCRATIC ECONOMICS
IWAN MORGAN
Institute for the Study of the Americas, University of London
A B S T R ACT. Jimmy Carter’s response to stagﬂation, the unprecedented combination of stagnation and
double-digit inﬂation that aﬄicted the American economy during his presidency, made him the subject of
virulent attack from liberal Democrats for betraying New Deal traditions of activist government to sustain
high employment and strong economic growth. Carter found himself accused of being a do-nothing president
whose name had become ‘a synonym for economic mismanagement ’ like Herbert Hoover’s in the 1930s.1
Liberal disenchantment fuelled Edward Kennedy’s quixotic crusade to wrest the 1980 Democratic presi-
dential nomination from Carter. ‘ [H]e has left behind the best traditions of the Democratic Party ’, the
Massachusetts senator charged, ‘We are instructed that the New Deal is old hat and that our best hope is no
deal at all. ’2 A quarter-century later a more dispassionate analysis would suggest that Carter was neither a
do-nothing president nor a throwback to the past in terms of economic policy. Far from being the ‘Jimmy
Hoover ’ of liberal obloquy, Carter was really ‘Jimmy Clinton ’ because in seeking solutions for stagﬂation
his administration laid the foundations of a new political economy that the next Democratic president would
build upon.
Assessments of presidential economic management conventionally rate Bill
Clinton a success and Jimmy Carter a failure because the economy performed so
much better in the 1990s than in the late 1970s.3 Indeed, so durable were negative
images of Carter’s economic failure that when Clinton ran for president, he was
on guard against being typecast as another southern governor who would
1 Sidney Weintraub, ‘Carter’s Hoover syndrome’, New Leader, 24 Mar. 1980, p. 18. See too,
Seymour Melman, ‘Jimmy Hoover? ’, New York Times, 7 Feb. 1979, and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, ‘The
great Carter mystery’, New Republic, 12 Apr. 1980, pp. 18–21.
2 Quoted in William E. Leuchtenburg, In the shadow of FDR: from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan (rev.
edn, Ithaca, NY, 1985), p. 203.
3 On a simple misery index (the combination of annual inﬂation and unemployment rates), Carter
has the worst record of any post-war president (1945–2000), while Clinton ranks ﬁfth of ten – the
highest of any post-1968 president. On the more complex misery index conceived by economist
Robert Barro, which measures inﬂation, unemployment, interest rates, and GDP growth, Carter
continues to occupy last place, but Clinton holds ﬁrst place just ahead of Ronald Reagan. See
Raymond Tatalovich and John Frendreis, ‘Clinton, class and economic policy’, in Steven E. Schier,
ed., The post-modern presidency : Bill Clinton’s legacy in U.S. politics (Pittsburgh, 2000), pp. 43–4, and Robert
Barro, ‘Reagan vs. Clinton: who’s the economic champ?’, Business Week, 22 Feb. 1999, p. 22. For a
staunch but not wholly convincing econometric defence of Carter’s record, see Ann Mari May, ‘Fiscal
policy, monetary policy and the Carter presidency’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 23 (1993), pp. 699–711.
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mismanage the nation’s prosperity.4 However, the diﬀerent rankings of these two
Democratic presidents in what one scholar has criticized as ‘narrow scorecard
history’ should not obscure what is arguably their real historical signiﬁcance in
terms of economic governance.5 Both pursued a common goal to renegotiate the
New Deal compact between their party and the American people. With regard to
political economy, this entailed a more limited role for government than was the
case from the 1940s through the 1960s. Whatever their diﬀerences in detail, the
Carter and Clinton economic programmes, as ﬁnally constituted, shared com-
mon principles : greater reliance on the market economy to achieve prosperity ;
prioritization of the inﬂation problem over unemployment ; restoration of bal-
anced budgets ; the elevation of monetary policy over ﬁscal policy as the principal
instrument of economic management ; and emphasis on supply-side measures to
enhance investment and long-term economic strength.
The economic course steered by both Carter and Clinton departed from the
liberal tenets of the ﬁscal revolution of the mid-twentieth century. Post-war
Democratic administrations drew upon Keynesian doctrines that Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s administration had adopted hesitantly in the late 1930s and then
applied more robustly to underwrite full economic recovery from the Great
Depression during the Second World War.6 Public policy therefore facilitated the
transition from the producer-oriented capitalism of the American past to the
consumer-oriented capitalism of modern times. In the Keynesian ethos, it was not
the level of saving that determined the level of investment, as classical economics
decreed, but the level of consumption because demand for goods was the deter-
minant of business conﬁdence. Manipulation of aggregate demand through fed-
eral spending and taxation constituted the organizing principle of Democratic
economic policy for thirty years after the war. The Employment Act of 1946
legitimized, albeit vaguely, government responsibility for maximum employment,
production, and purchasing power and signalled the president’s status as chief
manager of prosperity by creating the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) to
assist him. Over the next two decades Democratic economic activism grew in-
creasingly ambitious. At the minimum, exempliﬁed by Harry Truman’s response
to the 1949 recession, it entailed running countercyclical budget deﬁcits to com-
pensate for decline in the private economy. More signiﬁcantly, as optimism grew
about the seemingly limitless capacity of the post-war economy, the Democrats
sought to accelerate economic expansion in the recovery stage of the business
cycle.
4 Bob Woodward, The agenda: inside the Clinton White House (New York, 1994), pp. 23, 62; Martin
Walker, Clinton: the president they deserve (rev. edn, London, 1997), pp. 155, 166.
5 See Bruce J. Schulman, ‘Slouching towards the supply-side: Jimmy Carter and the new American
political economy’, in Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham, eds., The Carter presidency : policy choices in
the post-New Deal era (Lawrence, KS, 1998), esp. pp. 51–2.
6 The best economic study remains Herbert Stein, The ﬁscal revolution (Chicago, 1969). For the
political impact of Keynesianism, see Alan Brinkley, The end of reform: New Deal liberalism in recession and
war (New York, 1995).
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What one historian has labelled ‘growth liberalism’ was promoted initially
by the Truman CEA, was developed further in the late 1950s as a Democratic
antidote for the slack economy of Eisenhower’s second term, and found ultimate
expression in the new economics of the Kennedy–Johnson administrations
that utilized consumption-boosting tax reduction to close the production gap
between actual and potential economic growth.7 The expansion of productive
capacity generated not only full employment but also bumper tax revenues to
fund social activism at home and containment of communism abroad. It was also
seen as the means to keep inﬂation at bay. The Keynesian economists who
directed 1960s Democratic economics from their CEA bailiwick were conﬁdent of
achieving a benign ‘Phillips curve trade-oﬀ ’, whereby policy-makers could
choose combinations of inﬂation and unemployment rates that were appropriate
in light of their relative costs.8 Their optimism on this score barely faltered even as
the additional demand pressures of Vietnam war spending on an economy
eﬀectively operating at full capacity drove up the annual inﬂation rate from under
2 per cent in 1964 to 4.7 per cent in 1968. The inclusion in the Johnson CEA’s
ﬁnal economic report of a Phillips curve diagram based on annual inﬂation and
unemployment data from 1954 to 1968 expressed the conventional Keynesian
belief that movement up and down the curve was still possible. CEA chair Arthur
Okun acknowledged that the ‘ task of combining prosperity with price stability
now stands as the major unsolved problem of aggregative economic perform-
ance ’, but insisted that a ‘ satisfactory compromise’ between these two ends could
be formulated.9
In their eﬀorts to ﬁnd this satisfactory compromise, the next two Democratic
presidents moved away from Keynesianism but did not embrace a new theory
in its place. Their mode of economic governance was empirical and pragmatic
rather than doctrinaire. As such it was in harmony with the political beliefs
of both Carter and Clinton. Neither of these former southern governors was a
devotee of the socioeconomic liberalism instilled in the northern wing of their
party by the New Deal. Carter traced his political values to early twentieth-
century southern progressivism with its concern for economy and eﬃciency
in government and compassion for the poor. He described himself as a ﬁscal
conservative, but liberal on matters like civil rights, the environment, and
‘helping people to overcome handicaps to lead fruitful lives ’, an ideological
7 Robert M. Collins,More : the politics of economic growth in postwar America (New York, 2000), pp. 17–97.
See too: Iwan Morgan, Eisenhower versus ‘ the spenders ’ : the Eisenhower administration, the Democrats and the
budget, 1953–1960 (London, 1990), pp. 40–8, 171–3; Allen J. Matusow, The unraveling of America : a history of
liberalism in the 1960s (New York, 1984), pp. 30–59, 153–79.
8 Economic report of the president 1962, pp. 44–8. See too the memoir of CEAmember James Tobin, The
new economics a decade older (Princeton, 1974), pp. 15–17. For the Phillips curve, which tracked the
relationship between rising wages and inﬂation and declining unemployment, see A. W. Phillips, ‘The
relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of money wage rates in the United
Kingdom, 1861–1957 ’, Economica, 25 (1958), pp. 283–99.
9 Economic report of the president 1969, p. 42; Arthur Okun, The political economy of prosperity (Washington,
DC, 1970), p. 130.
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construct that appeared to make him the legatee of Dwight Eisenhower
rather than Franklin D. Roosevelt.10 Clinton deﬁned himself as a centrist New
Democrat rather than a New Deal Democrat and played a leading role in
the project of the southern-dominated Democratic Leadership Council to move
the party away from its liberal traditions. Announcing his presidential candidacy
in 1991, he articulated a vision for expanded economic opportunity that was
resolutely ambiguous in its ideological character. ‘The change we must make
isn’t liberal or conservative ’, Clinton avowed, ‘ It’s both and it’s neither. ’
Such androgynous values saddled him with a reputation for expediency and
inconsistency but later enabled him to deal with a Republican congress through
a triangulation strategy. In 1995–6 Clinton did much to constrain the ‘con-
tract with America ’ agenda of conservative Republicans by reaﬃrming his
centrist image through identiﬁcation with the most popular symbols of both
parties – middle-class entitlements in the case of the Democrats and balanced
budgets, welfare reform, and tough-on-crime initiatives in the case of the
Republicans.11
Economic circumstances reinforced the non-doctrinaire nature of post-
Keynesian Democratic economic management. In Carter’s case, the battle
against stagﬂation entailed initial dithering about whether to prioritize inﬂation
or unemployment and repeated policy failure before adoption of a robust anti-
inﬂation strategy from an increasingly limited range of policy choices. The fog of
uncertainty inhibited conﬁdent assertion that his administration was on the right
economic course. In April 1978 a White House aide warned, ‘It is important, if we
do not know the consequences of our actions, or know them to be small in eﬀect
and limited in duration, not to promise too much …Whatever steps are an-
nounced, we should try to have viewed as a pragmatic response to the immediate
situation with the promise of further actions to follow. ’12 Even when the admin-
istration ﬁnally decided to prioritize inﬂation, its rhetoric remained hesitant and
qualiﬁed. Just before Carter addressed the nation about a new anti-inﬂation
strategy in October 1978, his media advisers urged him to warn that Americans
‘ should not expect too much from these or any other measures … Bringing in-
ﬂation under control is a slow, tedious, on-going process – there is no quick ﬁx. ’
The president duly told his audience, ‘ [T]here is no single solution for inﬂation.
What we have, instead, is a number of partial measures. Some of them may help,
10 Jimmy Carter, Keeping faith : memoirs of a president (New York, 1982), pp. 73–4. See too John
Dumbrell, The Carter presidency : a re-evaluation (Manchester, 1993) ; and Kenneth E. Morris, Jimmy Carter :
American moralist (Athens, GA, 1996).
11 ‘Announcement of candidacy for president by Bill Clinton’, 3 Oct. 1991, speech reproduced in
Robert E. Levin, Bill Clinton : the inside story (New York, 1992), pp. 277–87 (quote p. 281) ; Bert A.
Rockman, ‘Cutting with the grain: is there a Clinton leadership legacy? ’, in Colin Campbell and Bert
A. Rockman, eds., The Clinton legacy (New York, 2000), pp. 274–94; Bruce Miroﬀ, ‘Courting the public :
Bill Clinton’s postmodern education’, in Schier, ed., Post-modern presidency, pp. 106–23.
12 Al Stern to Stuart Eizenstat, ‘ Inﬂation’, 4 Apr. 1978, domestic policy staﬀ [dps] – Eizenstat, box
144, Jimmy Carter Library ( JCL).
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others will not … [we have] to maintain a constant search for additional steps
which may be eﬀective. ’13
Thereafter Carter’s speeches grew progressively pessimistic in the face of
seemingly intractable economic problems and held out little hope of immediate
improvement. To the ears of the then obscure young governor of Arkansas these
jeremiads made the president sound more ‘ like a 17th century New England
Puritan than a 20th century Southern Baptist ’.14 As president himself, Clinton
restored optimism to Democratic rhetoric but continued in practice to pursue a
cautious, empirical approach to economic policy. He campaigned in 1992 on a
promise of massive public investment to achieve the ‘most dramatic economic
growth program since the Second World War’.15 This appealed to voters worried
about job insecurity amidst a recession that had pushed the unemployment rate up
to 7.5 per cent in the pre-election period, but in oﬃce Clinton quickly shifted
emphasis to keeping inﬂation in check. One of the deﬁning characteristics of his
economic policy was the determination to learn from the mistakes of the past. It
pursued growth only insofar as anti-inﬂation imperatives allowed and sought to
eradicate what was deemed the principal threat to long-term economic
strength – the mammoth budget deﬁcit inherited from the Reagan era. This
meant treating economic policy as a technical matter of competent management
rather than as the grand crusade it had been for both post-war liberalism and 1980s
conservatism. It was only after the economy improved that the Clinton adminis-
tration oﬀered a coherent vision of how this had been achieved. The CEA’s 1997
economic report outlined amiddle-way strategy between tax and spend liberalism and
the trickle down ethos of Reaganomics. ‘Arriving at an economic philosophy that
lies between these two’, avowed CEA chair Joseph Stiglitz, ‘ represents an
achievement in the sense that it lays a new course, a direction for our time. ’16
Though critical of the report, liberal economist James Galbraith acknowledged,
‘After three years of tacking one way and another, the Clinton council here has
made its most serious attempt to deﬁne how it thinks and what it stands for. ’17
13 Jerry Rafshoon, Greg Schneider, and Jim Fallows, memorandum for the president, ‘Anti-
inﬂation ‘‘ﬁreside’’ ’, 4 Oct. 1978, staﬀ secretary’s ﬁle (ssf ) – presidential handwriting ﬁle (phf ), box
105, JCL; ‘Anti-inﬂation program’, Public papers of the presidents of the United States (hereafter Public papers) :
Jimmy Carter 1978 II, p. 1840.
14 Quoted in William E. Leuchtenburg, ‘ Jimmy Carter and the post-New Deal presidency’, in Fink
and Graham, eds., The Carter presidency, p. 21. Historian Leo Ribuﬀo has suggested that Carter’s
‘visceral puritanism’ predisposed him to accommodate rather than seek to overcome the limits of the
1970s economy. See Ribuﬀo, ‘Jimmy Carter and the selling of the president, 1976–1980’, in Herbert
D. Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky, eds., The presidency and domestic policies of Jimmy Carter (Westport,
CT, 1994), p. 616.
15 Bill Clinton and Al Gore, Putting people ﬁrst : how we can all change America (New York, 1992), p. 7.
16 Economic report of the president 1997 ; Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Defending the Clinton administration’,
Challenge, 40 (May–June 1997), p. 22.
17 James Galbraith, ‘The Clinton administration’s vision’, Challenge, 40 ( July–Aug. 1997), p. 45.
Previous CEA statements of a new economic philosophy had been made in the relevant administra-
tion’s ﬁrst economic report – 1954 for Eisenhower economics, 1962 for the new economics, and 1982
for Reaganomics.
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Shortly after his narrow election victory in 1992, Clinton acknowledged,
‘The economy is why we started down this road … [and] the economy is why
the American people gave me the chance … to turn this country around. ’18
Accordingly economic issues were at the core of his presidential agenda from
the outset. By contrast, Carter did not give them the same prominence until
he had been in oﬃce for over eighteen months.19 In late 1977 Vice President
Walter Mondale in vain urged him to use the forthcoming state of the union
address to make the economy the administration’s cardinal issue.20 As domestic
policy aide Bob Ginsberg commented, ‘ I do not think the President sees himself
as, or will want to run for reelection as, a ‘‘man of the economy’’. ’21
Carter’s reluctance to be a ‘man of the economy’ was unsurprising given CEA
projections that his ﬁrst term economic record would be only average, but it also
testiﬁed to the initial fuzziness of his economic agenda. When he took oﬃce
nearly 8 million Americans, 7.5 per cent of the labour force, were unemployed,
while inﬂation was a relatively low 4.8 per cent. The economy was in an abnor-
mally slow recovery from the 1974–5 recession, the worst since the 1930s, which
had been triggered by ﬁscal and monetary restraint to curb the surge of inﬂation
above 12 per cent in the wake of the oil price increases levied by the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Carter owed his narrow election as
president in 1976 to the solid support of the traditional Democratic constituency
of blue-collar and low-income voters who were worried about unemployment.
Accordingly, he recognized that ‘ joblessness was our most pressing economic
problem’, yet he also worried that the record $73.7 billion deﬁcit inherited from
the Ford administration and the constant escalation of federal spending were
‘root causes ’ of inﬂation.22 Carter’s early attempts to balance these unemploy-
ment and inﬂation concerns made his economic policy appear confused and
vacillating.
In the planning sessions to develop the new administration’s economic
policy, Carter showed himself more optimistic about the prospects of employ-
ment growth without large-scale federal stimulus than the economists called in
from the Democratic party’s Keynesian cadre to advise his transition team. One
of these, Lawrence Klein, later commented, ‘We were surprised at how closely
the unemployment rate ﬁtted in with his view and the way things worked
out. ’ At the time, however, CEA chairman-designate Charles Schultze stated
18 Quoted in President Clinton’s new beginning : the complete text … of the historic Clinton–Gore economic con-
ference, Little Rock, Arkansas, December 14–15, 1992 (New York, 1992), p. 3.
19 See W. Carl Biven, Jimmy Carter’s economy: policy in an age of limits (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002) ;
Schulman, ‘Slouching towards the supply-side’, pp. 51–71 ; and John T. Woolley, ‘Exorcising
inﬂation-mindedness : the transformation of economic management in the 1970s ’, Journal of Policy
History, 10 (1998), pp. 130–52.
20 Mondale to Stuart Eizenstat, 7 Dec. 1977, dps – Eizenstat, box 194. Carter’s closest conﬁdante,
budget director Bert Lance, had also warned that his presidency would stand or fall on the economy.
See Bert Lance with Bill Gilbert, The truth of the matter : my life in and out of politics (New York, 1991), p. 127.
21 Ginsberg to Eizenstat, 7 Dec. 1977, Eizenstat to Mondale, 7 Dec. 1977, dps – Eizenstat, box 194.
22 Carter, Keeping faith, pp. 75–6.
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unequivocally that at current growth rates there would still be slack in the
economy two years hence and a stimulus programme could be undertaken
without fuelling inﬂation.23 Carter bowed to this expert advice, though without
enthusiasm and within the limits of his instincts. On 31 January 1977, he
announced a stimulus programme whose $15.5 billion cost for ﬁscal 1977 ran
counter to his own prudence but drew criticism from Keynesian doyen Walter
Heller as ‘unduly modest ’ at less than 1 per cent of gross national product.24
In mid-April, signs that unemployment was falling faster than expected led
Carter to withdraw a key element of the stimulus, the $50 per capita tax rebate, on
grounds that its eﬀects were now likely to be inﬂationary. At the next day’s press
conference, however, he avowed: ‘I think that if you deliberately accept un-
employment as a means to control inﬂation, that’s wrong. ’25 The administration
consequently eschewed bold action against either element of the stagﬂation
problem for fear of the unacceptable consequences for the other. It was not
a position that could be held indeﬁnitely. In late 1977 the CEA warned
Carter that failure to reduce the underlying inﬂation rate – now above 6 per
cent – would result in ‘ signiﬁcant acceleration’ of price instability in late 1979 or
early 1980, which would ‘pose a serious threat to the continuation of healthy
expansion’.26
Acknowledging the growing severity of the inﬂation problem proved
easier than resolving it. Lacking a clear doctrinal impulse, Carter’s economic
programme evolved incrementally in response to the shifting balance of
power between the groups within the administration competing for the presi-
dent’s ear. The disorganization of economic policymaking structures, which
lacked a clear chain of command, increased the diﬃculties of achieving consensus
in support of strong measures. Oﬃcials from the Oﬃce of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the treasury and the conservative Georgians on the
presidential staﬀ wanted all-out war on inﬂation even at the cost of economic
slowdown. In their view a short recession early in Carter’s presidency would
not harm his reelection if price stability was restored.27 Aligned against them
were the heads of cabinet departments like health, education and welfare,
housing and urban development, and labour, who were anxious to protect
23 Klein quoted in Biven, Carter’s economy, p. 79; Charles Schultze to Walter Mondale, ‘Anti-
inﬂation aspects of the administration’s economic program’, 19 Jan. 1977, dps – Eizenstat, box 144,
JCL.
24 ‘Economic recovery program’, Public papers : Carter 1977 I, pp. 47–55; Committee on Ways and
Means, Hearings on the Tax Aspects of President Carter’s Economic Stimulus Program, 94th
Congress, 1st session, p. 199.
25 Carter interview, JCL (Miller Center Oral History) ; ‘The president’s news conference of April
15, 1977 ’, Public papers : Carter 1977 I, p. 633.
26 Schultze, memorandum for the president, ‘Friday morning meeting with your economic
advisers ’, 7 Dec. 1977, ssf – phf, box 63, JCL.
27 OMB director James McIntyre interview, JCL; treasury secretary Michael Blumenthal to the
president, ‘Possible further cut in FY ’79 budget ’, undated (but mid-May 1978 – Carter wrote on it
‘ I agree with thrust ’), phf – ssf, box 87, JCL; Gerald Rafshoon to Carter, 1 Sept. 1978, ibid., box 101.
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their constituencies against spending cuts and recession.28 A third group com-
prising the CEA, domestic policy chief Stuart Eizenstat and his staﬀ, inﬂation
adviser Alfred Kahn and Vice President Mondale eﬀectively held the balance. It
initially sought a way of restraining inﬂation without economic contraction but
eventually came to accept the need for progressively stronger measures to attain
price stability. Eizenstat later acknowledged that the administration had been too
temperate in addressing inﬂation early on. ‘ I was very much part of that tem-
perance’, he reﬂected, ‘because there was a mortal fear among Keynesians of
throwing the economy into recession and of hurting poor people, hurting our
constituents. ’29
The most signiﬁcant indication of the eclipse of Keynesian thinking was the
CEA’s eventual advocacy of anti-inﬂation imperatives. A fellow of the liberal
think tank, the Brookings Foundation, Charles Schultze was the voice of the old
orthodoxy in the administration. In July 1977 he urged Carter to adopt a 1960s
style ﬁne-tuning approach that would safeguard economic growth through ‘a
balanced high-employment budget strategy … [by which] the ﬁscal dials are set
to produce a balanced budget in 1981 only if the economy returns to high em-
ployment ’.30 Like other Keynesians, Schultze attributed inﬂation to demand
shocks, namely the Vietnam war and President Nixon’s excessive stimulation of
the economy to achieve reelection, and the OPEC oil price shock that he mis-
takenly assumed would not recur. Only belatedly did the CEA perceive the
existence of a new and more dangerous source of inﬂation in the 1970s, the
slowdown in productivity growth. As a result its early economic forecasts of
modest employment growth and relative price stability proved inaccurate. A
frustrated Carter reportedly exploded at one cabinet meeting, ‘There’s a mystic
down in Smithsville who’s got as good a batting average as my economic ad-
visers. ’ When the CEA eventually produced more realistic estimates of inﬂation,
the president ruefully commented, ‘I hope your present forecasts are also
wrong! ’31
Average annual productivity growth, which had been a healthy 2.8 per cent
between 1945 and 1973, dropped below 1 per cent in the mid-1970s and actually
turned negative in 1979. The reasons for this were unclear at the time and remain
a matter of largely ill-informed speculation.32 The productivity slowdown, which
was diﬃcult to perceive until it had been going on for some time, led to crucial
28 Health, education, and welfare secretary Joseph Califano to the president, ‘ Inﬂation and budget
strategy for ﬁscal 1980’, 18 Sept. 1978, dps – Eizenstat, box 145, JCL; labour secretary Ray Marshall to
the president, ‘Responsibility for inﬂation’, 17 Oct., 1977, ssf – phf, box 56, JCL.
29 Quoted in Hobart Rowen, Self-inﬂicted wounds : from LBJ’s guns and butter to Reagan’s voodoo economics
(New York, 1994), p. 176.
30 Schultze to the president, ‘Economic and budgetary outlook for ﬁscal years 1979–1981’, 7 July
1977, dps – Eizenstat, box 191, JCL.
31 Carter quoted in Hobart Rowen, ‘The tax-cut dilemma’, Washington Post, 11 May 1978, p. 1 ;
Schultze to the president, ‘Our past forecasts ’, 14 Dec. 1979, ssf – phf, box 160, JCL.
32 For analysis of the causes of the slowdown, see Paul Krugman, Peddling prosperity : economic sense and
nonsense in the age of diminished expectations (New York, 1994), pp. 55–65.
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errors in policy because the CEA overestimated the economy’s potential output
and consequently its level of slack, which determined how much it could be
stimulated before inﬂation grew. What ﬁnally alerted the Carter economists to the
decline was that unemployment was actually falling faster than economic growth
warranted because it now took more workers to increase gross domestic product
(GDP). In May 1978 Shultze advised the president that the productivity slowdown
necessitated ‘considering strategies to reduce the FY 1979 and 1980 budget deﬁ-
cits ’. Carter underlined these words on his copy of the memorandum and penned
in the margin ‘a new convert? ’.33 Nevertheless, the CEA continued to under-
estimate the problem, which it hoped would be temporary, so its assessment of
how much restraint was needed to curb inﬂation remained faulty. Not until late
1979, by when the core inﬂation rate was running at 9 per cent even without
allowance for the eﬀects of the new round of oil price increases imposed by OPEC
in the wake of the Iranian revolution, did Schultze recognize the true severity of
the productivity decline.34
Carter announced his determination to make the conquest of inﬂation his chief
economic priority in an address to the nation on 24 October 1978. The new
programme he unveiled contained deregulation initiatives, budgetary restraint, a
cap on federal hiring, new wage–price guidelines, federal procurement restric-
tions in favour of ﬁrms that upheld the guidelines, and a proposal for real-wage
insurance giving workers who met the pay standards a tax rebate if annual
inﬂation exceeded 7 per cent.35 The most successful component was deregulation,
but this was a policy that acquired an anti-inﬂation rationale rather than being
speciﬁcally conceived to this end. Reaction against economic regulation grew in
the early 1970s because of broad concern that it served the entrenched interests of
producers and workers in an industry rather than the public, inhibited inno-
vation, and distorted prices. Hearings held in 1975 by the senate’s subcommittee
on administrative practice and procedure, chaired by Edward Kennedy, had put
deregulation on the political agenda. Carter himself had promised in his 1976
campaign to promote deregulation in the name of equity and eﬃciency and made
the airlines his ﬁrst target. The battle against inﬂation gave added momentum to
this agenda, which was extended to include trucking, railways, and ﬁnancial
institutions. This swathe of deregulation was enacted in the face of considerable
opposition from special interests and arguably constituted Carter’s greatest
economic achievement.36 In contrast, the rest of his 1978 anti-inﬂation pro-
gramme proved a damp squib.
33 Schultze to the president, ‘Some disturbing thoughts about the economic outlook’, 6 May 1978,
ssf – phf, box 84, JCL.
34 Schultze to the president, ‘Brieﬁng notes for tomorrow’s meeting with Giaimo and Muskie’, 10
May 1978, ssf – phf, box 85, JCL, and ‘An outline of short and long-run anti-inﬂation strategy’, 17 Oct.
1979, ibid., box 152. 35 Public papers : Carter 1978 II, pp. 1839–48.
36 Biven, Carter’s economy, pp. 217–22; Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk, The politics of deregulation
(Washington, DC, 1985) ; Dorothy Robyn, Breaking the special interests : trucking deregulation and the politics of
policy reform (Chicago, 1987).
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The administration held high hopes for the wage–price guidelines but the
surge of inﬂation generated by the oil price increases of 1979 torpedoed them at
launch. As a result they antagonized the unions, bred public cynicism that
violations would be penalized, and proved virtually impossible to administer.37
In March 1979 the president’s new inﬂation adviser, Alfred Kahn, warned, ‘The
price standards are close to futile in an overheated economy. They are
being ignored by many businesses …. Without price restraint, there is no chance
that labor will continue to accept wage increases well below the expected rise
in the cost of living. ’38 Though the CEA later claimed that the guidelines
had moderated wage increases in 1979 by 1 to 1.5 percentage points, this did
little to mitigate the actual inﬂation rate of 13.3 per cent. A more pessimistic
assessment by the General Accounting Oﬃce found ‘no convincing evidence’
that they had ‘any eﬀect ’ on inﬂation in 1979–80.39 Meanwhile the rapid rise in
inﬂation persuaded congress to reject the real-wage insurance proposal for fear
that this would saddle the government with huge costs at a time of budgetary
retrenchment.
Carter’s eﬀorts to impose ﬁscal restraint also had limited economic success in
the war on inﬂation but had immense consequences for Democratic unity. In the
eyes of the president and his advisers, budget deﬁcits had become harbingers of
inﬂation that drove up interest rates, aggravated demand pressures at a time of
productivity decline, and served as a bad example of public excess when business
and labour were being asked to practise price and wage restraint.40 Their ﬁscal
1980 budget plan, which presidential aides described as ‘ the most constrained
budget in years ’, aimed to reduce the deﬁcit to $29 billion, half the ﬁscal 1978
level, as a prelude to balancing the budget in ﬁscal 1981.41 On this occasion an
internal administration debate about whether to specify such an ambitious target
resulted in victory for treasury and OMB hawks over the domestic policy staﬀ,
who warned that it would alienate the Democratic constituencies and might
produce economic slowdown, and the CEA, which estimated that a deﬁcit of $32
to $35 billion was more realistic.42 Experience soon showed, however, that ﬁscal
policy was an ineﬀective instrument against inﬂation.
Achieving deﬁcit reduction of the scale planned required cutbacks in real
spending, but the administration signally failed to persuade congress to support
37 Ray Marshall to Charles Schultze, 16 Mar. 1979, White House central ﬁles – subject ﬁles
(whcf – sf ), series BE-4, box BE-19, JCL.
38 Alfred Kahn to the president, ‘Anti-inﬂation policy’, 16 Mar. 1979, ssf – phf, box 123, JCL.
39 Economic report of the president 1981, p. 59; General Accounting Oﬃce, The voluntary pay and price
standards (Washington, DC, 1980), pp. 1–2.
40 See, for example, Charles Schultze to the president, ‘Califano’s memorandum on budget strat-
egy for ﬁscal 1980’, 2 Oct. 1978, ssf – phf, box 105, JCL.
41 James McIntyre and Frank Moore to the president, ‘White House budget task force’, 6 Dec.
1978, ssf – phf, box 111, JCL.
42 Michael Blumenthal to the president, 27 Sept. 1978, Eizenstat and Bob Ginsburg to the president,
‘Schultze decision memo on the anti-inﬂation program’, 29 Sept. 1978, Charles Schultze to the
president, ‘Ani-inﬂation program: decision memo’, 26 Sept. 1978, dps – Eizenstat, box 145, JCL.
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retrenchment. Inherited legislative commitments for expenditure expansion and
the magnitude of uncontrollable entitlement programmes, notably those
beneﬁting the elderly, limited the margin for discretionary budget reductions.
To make matters worse, the decline of de´tente and renewal of Cold War
tensions prompted Carter to propose a 3 per cent real increase in military
spending in the otherwise austere ﬁscal 1980 budget plan.43 This attempt to
ﬁnance defence expansion through domestic spending retrenchment ran
counter to the New Deal tradition. It outraged core Democratic constituencies
like labour, African Americans, and urban groups. The congressional black
caucus, for example, castigated the budget as ‘unjust and immoral ’ in its treat-
ment of the poor and disadvantaged. The president’s frosty reception at the
Democratic mid-term convention in Memphis in December 1978 prefaced the
diﬃculties he would encounter with liberal Democrats in congress and in the
party at large over the next two years.44 Congress eventually voted even more
money than Carter requested to build up America’s military but also increased
appropriations for the domestic programmes he wanted to cut. As a result, total
federal spending grew from 20.7 per cent to 22.2 per cent of GDP between ﬁscal
1977 and ﬁscal 1981 and discretionary expenditure on domestic programmes was
2.4 per cent higher in real terms in the ‘austerity ’ budget of ﬁscal 1980 than in
ﬁscal 1979.
Carter’s hopes of balancing the budget were blown even further oﬀ course by
economic slowdown and recession. Having whittled down the record imbalance
inherited from Ford to $40.2 billion in ﬁscal 1979, the president saw his ﬁnal two
budgets accumulate enlarged deﬁcits of $73.8 billion and $79 billion. The only
comfort to the administration was that the rate of expenditure growth had
slowed. Human resource spending, the largest element of the federal budget, had
increased from 7.0 per cent to 11.2 per cent of GDP between ﬁscal 1969 and 1977,
but stood at only 11.8 per cent of GDP in ﬁscal 1981.45 Even so, an air of
desperation permeated the White House in the face of the growing deﬁcit. OMB
forecasts that the ﬁscal 1980 deﬁcit would be at least 50 per cent higher than
expected made nonsense of the nearly balanced budget projection in the ﬁscal
1981 budget plan that went to congress in January 1980. This caused panic on
Wall Street, which led in late February to the collapse in the bond market, the
major source of capital investment, because of concern that a rising deﬁcit would
aggravate inﬂationary pressures which would in turn undermine the value of
assets. In reality bond prices had been in decline since October 1979 and portfolio
losses over the next four months ran to an estimated $400 billion. Nevertheless,
43 Dennis Ippolito, Why budgets matter : budget policy and American politics (University Park, PA, 2003),
pp. 208–21.
44 ‘Congressional black caucus statement on economic policy’, 19 Jan. 1979, copy in staﬀ oﬃce
ﬁles – Louis Martin, box 15, JCL; Burton I. Kaufman, The presidency of James Earl Carter Jr (Lawrence,
KS, 1993), pp. 133–5.
45 Historical tables, budget of the United States government, ﬁscal year 2005 (Washington, DC, 2004),
pp. 48–9.
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Carter’s budget was widely held to have tipped the bond market into freefall.46
In an eﬀort to restore investor conﬁdence, the president took the unprecedented
step of recalling his budget from congress and instructed his economic policy
team to produce a new balanced budget plan with additional spending cuts for
presentation in March. Yet there was no prospect of congress enacting all the new
cuts, while the depressing eﬀect of economic slowdown on revenue was certain to
produce a budget imbalance even if the proposed retrenchment were achieved.
As Stuart Eizenstat presciently warned ‘[W]e are proposing a budget program
which is unachievable and undesirable in the present recessionary climate. ’47
The abject failure of wage–price guidelines and budgetary restraint left
monetary policy as the only viable option in the battle against inﬂation.
Paradoxically, Carter had in early 1978 denied a second term as federal reserve
chairman to Arthur Burns, a Nixon appointee who was unsympathetic to the
administration’s initial preference for a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and un-
employment. Even treasury secretary Blumenthal joined Schultze in counselling
the president that Burns ‘will not hesitate to frustrate the employment goal if
he thinks there is the slightest risk for the inﬂation goal ’. They also warned him,
‘A Fed chairman forceful enough to dominate the Board has the power to enforce
his own priorities on the nation. ’48 This was precisely what happened when
Carter eventually came to rely on monetary policy to ﬁght inﬂation. The key
institutional change between the old and new Democratic political economy
would be the president’s de facto replacement as chief economic manager by the
federal reserve chair.
Burns’s replacement, William Miller, proved too soft on inﬂation when ad-
ministration priorities changed. In early 1979 Schultze warned that the federal
reserve was ‘exerting very modest restraint ’, the ﬁrst ever expression of concern
by any Democratic CEA chair that monetary policy was not tight enough.49
Eventually in August 1979 Miller was persuaded to become treasury secretary and
was replaced by Paul Volcker, an inﬂation hawk who had won the conﬁdence
both of Wall Street and the international currency markets as president of the
New York federal reserve bank. Before accepting the post, Volcker made plain to
Carter his convictions about ‘ the importance of an independent central bank and
the need for tighter money’. In his ﬁrst appearance before congress as fed chair,
46 ‘America’s bond market crash’, Economist, 8 Mar. 1980, pp. 12–13; ‘A lever against inﬂation’,
editorial, Washington Post, 24 Feb. 1980, p. B6; ‘The case for a new, and balanced, budget ’, editorial,
New York Times, 28 Feb. 1980, p. 22. See too, JosephWhite and AaronWildavsky, The deﬁcit and the public
interest : the search for responsible budgeting in the 1980s (Berkeley, 1989), pp. 28–33.
47 Stuart Eizenstat to the president, ‘Economic decisions’, 1 Mar. 1980, ssf – phf, box 173, JCL.
48 Blumenthal and Schultze to the president, 10 Dec. 1977, Lipschutz ﬁle – federal reserve board,
box 10, JCL. See, too, Wyatt Wells, Economist in an uncertain world : Arthur Burns and the federal reserve,
1970–1978 (New York, 1994).
49 Schultze to the president, ‘Policy response to recent economic developments’, 16 Mar. 1979,
ssf – phf, box 123, JCL. Blumenthal and Schultze orchestrated a campaign of press leaks to pressurize
Miller into action until rebuked by Carter for ‘unnecessary and improper’ conduct, a handwritten
comment on Schultze to the president, 11 Apr. 1979, whcf – sf, FI-27, box FI-7, JCL.
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he reaﬃrmed his belief in the absolute priority of price stability and the
impossibility of an inﬂation–unemployment trade-oﬀ. ‘That is the lesson of the
1970s ’, Volcker declared, ‘not just in the United States but elsewhere. ’50
On 6 October 1979 a secret meeting of the federal reserve board agreed to
adopt monetary targeting, which entailed controlling the aggregate quantity of
money and reserves, rather than the conventional anti-inﬂation policy of in-
cremental interest rate rises. This gave the fed greater control over the money
supply and put the onus on banks and ﬁnancial markets to raise interest rates.51
The combined eﬀect of skyrocketing interest rates and the federal reserve’s
imposition at the president’s behest of consumer credit controls in March 1980
pushed the economy into a brief but sharp recession, marked by the steepest ever
quarterly decline of GDP between April and June. Paradoxically credit control
was an administration eﬀort to ease the cost of consumer borrowing by slowing
down credit expansion, but the psychological eﬀect on consumer conﬁdence was
much greater than expected. As one analyst has noted, the controls may well have
blurred the eﬀects of monetary restraint and prolonged ‘ the transition to a non-
inﬂationary environment ’.52 Their unexpected impact persuaded Congress in
July to revoke the 1969 legislation that gave the president authority to recommend
such restraint. This marked the end of the US peacetime experimentation with
formalized economic controls that had begun in the Nixon era. After the controls
were removed, however, the sharp rundown in debt, money supply, and interest
rates went into steep reversal with consequent ill eﬀects for inﬂation. In response,
Volcker trod on the monetary brakes again to drive interest rates up to record
levels in the pre-election period. After a brief respite at the start of Ronald
Reagan’s presidency, the fed lowered monetary targets once again in mid-1981
and ﬁnally succeeded in choking oﬀ the great inﬂation that had been building up
since the late 1960s – though at the cost of the worst recession since the 1930s.53
Carter’s oft-stated determination to conquer inﬂation meant that he had no
option but to be publicly supportive of Volcker despite the consequences of re-
straint for his reelection. The president’s sole deviation from this line was an
impromptu comment during the election campaign that the federal reserve
50 Paul Volcker and Toyoa Gyohten, Changing fortunes : the world’s money and the threat to America’s
leadership (New York, 1992), p. 64; house committee on the budget, Hearings on the economic outlook at
mid-summer, 95 : 1, pp. 293–4.
51 Volcker and Gyohten, Changing fortunes, pp. 166–8; Erwin Hargrove and Samuel Morley, eds.,
The president and the Council of Economic Advisors : interviews with CEA chairmen (Boulder, CO, 1984),
pp. 486–7. See too Paul Volcker, ‘The role of monetary targets in an age of inﬂation’, Journal of
monetary economics, 4 (1978), pp. 329–39.
52 Biven, Carter’s economy, p. 249. For advocacy of credit controls, see Kahn to the president, ‘Anti-
inﬂation policy’, 16 Mar. 1979, ssf – phf, box 123, and Eizenstat to the president, ‘Economic decisions’,
1 Mar. 1980, ibid., box 173, JCL.
53 Kenneth Bacon, ‘Ready reserve: fed vowing to retain ‘‘ tight money’’ policies ’,Wall Street Journal,
4 Aug. 1980, pp. 1, 11 ; William Greider, Secrets of the temple : how the federal reserve runs the country (New York,
1987), pp. 214–18; John W. Sloan, The Reagan eﬀect : economics and presidential leadership (Lawrence, KS,
1999), pp. 225–9.
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had ‘put too much of their eggs in the money supply basket ’. Otherwise the
administration always defended Volcker to Democratic sceptics and the party’s
various constituencies.54 In private, however, there was considerable doubt within
the White House as to whether, in Schultze’s words, ‘we went through more than
we had to’. The CEA preferred a traditional interest rate strategy against in-
ﬂation because the money supply strategy involved a huge risk. It was an untried
policy that could have been very destabilizing and might have produced a full
depression. At a conference on the Carter presidency a decade later, however,
Schultze reﬂected more positively on the federal reserve’s achievement. ‘For
Carter to stop the inﬂation’, he declared, ‘unemployment would have had to go
from 6 per cent to 10 per cent. No democratically elected president can or would
do it … You have to have an independent central bank. If I had said this thirty
years ago, I would have thrown rocks at myself. ’55
Of course, the transfer of anti-inﬂation responsibility to the federal reserve did
not solve the problem of how to restore productivity growth. In pursuit of this end,
the Carter administration moved hesitantly towards industrial policy, which en-
tailed a microeconomic and predominantly supply-side approach to speciﬁc sectors
of the economy in contrast to the demand-related macroeconomic approach of
ﬁscal and monetary policy. Its initiatives foreshadowed the strategy that Bill Clinton
advocated with more enthusiasm in 1992. Already well established in Western
Europe and Japan, industrial policy generally sought to revitalize older industries
and encourage the development of new ones. The Carter administration engaged
in a variety of piecemeal interventions to boost problem industries, such as the 1977
Solomon plan for the steel industry (which put a price ﬂoor under foreign steel and
established a committee to advise on modernization), the 1980 loan guarantee to
the ailing Chrysler automobile corporation (made conditional on government
oversight of the company’s performance), and the various deregulation initiatives.56
Encouraged by these ventures, some of Carter’s advisers eventually came to see
industrial policy as a strategic alternative to Reagan’s free market economics.
In a speech in April 1980, Stuart Eizenstat declared that Keynesianism had been
‘ill equipped’ to deal with productivity problems, so there needed to be ‘greater
emphasis on the supply side of the economy ’. A second Carter administration, he predicted,
would continue to emphasize restrained budgets to combat inﬂation but would also
54 Public papers : Carter 1980–1981 III, pp. 2040–1 ; Hargrove and Morley, The president and the CEA,
p. 499; Schultze to Congressman Jim Wright, 28 Nov. 1979, whcf – sf, FG 143, box FG-188, JCL.
In October 1979, commenting on union leader George Meany’s call that he get rid of Volcker, Carter
avowed, ‘The best way to get interest rates down is to lower inﬂation.’ See ‘Interview with the
president’, Public papers : Carter 1979 II, p. 2051.
55 Hargrove and Morley, The president and the CEA, p. 486; conference remarks in Biven, Carter’s
economy, p. 244.
56 Otis Graham, Losing time : the industrial policy debate (Cambridge, MA, 1992), esp. pp. 38–45;
Richard Vietor, Contrived competition : regulation and deregulation in America (Cambridge, MA, 1994),
pp. 14–15. For a sharp critique of Carter’s limited industrial policy, see Judith Stein, ‘The locomotive
loses power: the trade and industrial policies of Jimmy Carter ’, in Fink and Graham, eds., The Carter
presidency, pp. 72–94.
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develop supply-side tax incentives to boost investment, promote further deregula-
tion, and the redevelopment of ailing industries. ‘Wemust improve the productivity
of capital – through incentives for innovation, investment and savings – and of
labor – by employment and training programs funded by the federal government,
particularly for youths and minorities. ’ Eizenstat avowed, ‘We simply cannot rely
on the blunt tools of the past – universal tax cuts and broad spending programs.’57
The administration’s interdepartmental economic policy group worked on
developing an industrial policy plan in the summer of 1980. Carter accepted most
of its recommendations but balked at proposals for immediate business tax cuts
because he insisted on holding to the mid-year budget estimates recently sent to
congress. Unveiling the programme on 28 August, the president declared,
‘ Increasing productivity is the foremost economic challenge of the 1980s. ’ His
proposals included establishment of an economic revitalization board, a national
development bank, tripartite committees representing business, labour, and
government for major industries, assistance for regions undergoing industrial
decline, enhanced depreciation allowance to promote industrial modernization,
and investment tax credit revision to assist new businesses and ailing industries
that the current tax did not help because they had no earnings.58
This programme elicited little enthusiasm from business and labour and was
largely ignored by the media. Reagan’s election victory ensured that it would
never make the transition from blueprint to policy. Over the next decade, how-
ever, industrial policy was repackaged as strategic trade policy to emerge as the
formative inﬂuence on Bill Clinton’s grandiose plan for a public investment rev-
olution. The continued stagnation of productivity and the widening trade deﬁcit
in the 1980s strengthened the case of those who argued that Reaganite tax cuts for
the rich were the wrong supply-side prescription to enhance America’s competi-
tiveness in the new environment of economic globalization. Strategic traders
argued fundamentally that for America to prosper within the increasingly com-
petitive international economy it had to establish a leading role in what economist
Lester Thurow dubbed ‘sunrise industries ’, in which the application of new
technologies could boost productivity.59 Such thinking came under devastating
57 Transcript, ‘A non-economist’s look at economic policy for the 1980’s ’, speech at University of
North Carolina, 10 May 1980, James McIntyre records, box 5, JCL. For similar views, see (all in JCL):
Kahn to the president, ‘Taking stock on anti-inﬂationary policy’, 5 Nov. 1979, ssf – phf, box 155;
Eizenstat to the president, ‘Major economic and energy decisions’, 11 Dec. 1979, ibid., box 159; Al
Stern to Eizenstat, 17 Dec. 1979, dps – Eizenstat, box 192; ‘OMB director’s report on growth and
inﬂation’, June 1980, James McIntyre records, box 7.
58 William Miller to the president, ‘Background for meeting with economic advisers ’, 30 July 1980,
ssf – phf, box 197, JCL; ‘Remarks announcing the economic renewal program’, Public papers : Carter
1980–1981 II, pp. 1585–91 (quotation p. 1587).
59 Lester Thurow, The zero-sum society (New York, 1980). Other strategic trade tracts include: Business
Week, special issue, ‘The reindustrialization of America’, 30 June 1980; Robert B. Reich and Ira
Magaziner, Minding America’s business (New York, 1982) ; and Robert B. Reich, The next American frontier
(New York, 1983). See too Conrad P. Waligorski, Liberal economics and democracy : Keynes, Galbraith, Thurow
and Reich (Lawrence, KS, 1997).
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attack from the Democratic party’s economic policy intelligentsia at the August
1983 annual conference of the federal reserve bank of Kansas City at Jackson
Hole, Wyoming, on grounds that it overestimated the interdependence of the US
economy with the world economy, confused productivity with competitiveness,
exaggerated US industrial decline, and ignored empirical evidence in designating
some industries as ‘ sunrise ’ and others not.60 Accordingly, strategic trade did not
ﬁgure in the Democratic presidential campaign agendas of 1984 and 1988. It
found its way back into the fold thanks largely to Harvard professor and Clinton
conﬁdante Robert Reich, who conceived of public investment as a politically
more attractive means to the same ends.61
Clinton’s 1992 Putting people ﬁrst manifesto utilized Reich’s ideas in advocating
massive public investment in human capital, mainly education and training, and
infrastructure programmes like transportation, communication, and technology
to enhance America’s global competitiveness. Expenditure that could be labelled
‘ investment ’ and whose purpose was to help the ‘working middle class ’ ﬁtted the
new Democrat emphasis on personal opportunity and responsibility in preference
to tax and spend palliatives. Clinton signalled his intentions by inviting Robert
Reich to head his economics transition team. In his diary, the latter recorded the
president-elect telling him: ‘Macroeconomics is important, but micro is criti-
cal – productivity, education, job training, management–labor relations. So the
whole thrust will be new and diﬀerent. ’62
Despite this initial optimism federal outlays for non-defence public investment
actually declined from 1.8 per cent to 1.6 per cent of GDP between ﬁscal 1992 and
ﬁscal 2000. Clinton’s ambitions fell victim to the restoration of deﬁcit reduction
priorities at the outset of his presidency. The ﬁscal 1992 deﬁcit of $290.4 billion
(4.9 per cent of GDP) inherited from the Bush administration was far higher than
expected because of the depressing impact of the recession on tax revenues. This
marked a serious reversal of the downward movement of the deﬁcit in the late
1980s after the level of public borrowing had mushroomed in Ronald Reagan’s
ﬁrst term. In February 1993, Clinton warned congress that on current trends the
deﬁcit would grow to $635 billion, raising the national debt to nearly 80 per cent
of GDP, by the end of the decade.63
The renewed deﬁcit problem gave rise to a struggle over economic priorities
between two groups within the Clinton White House. The so-called ‘gang of
four ’ – treasury secretary Lloyd Bentsen, budget director Leon Panetta, deputy
60 Krugman, Peddling prosperity, pp. 254–66. The author wrote one of the background papers for the
conference.
61 See Robert B. Reich, The resurgent liberal (and other unfashionable prophecies) (New York, 1989), and
idem, The work of nations : preparing ourselves for 21st-century capitalism (New York, 1993).
62 Robert B. Reich, Locked in the cabinet (New York, 1997), p. 8.
63 ‘Address to the joint session of congress ’, Public papers : Clinton 1993 I, pp. 195–203. The deﬁcit
had declined from its high point of $207.8 billion (6.0 per cent GDP) in ﬁscal 1983 to $152.5 billion
(2.8 per cent GDP) in ﬁscal 1989. See Historical tables, budget of the United States government, ﬁscal year 2005,
p. 25 (and p. 157 for public investment statistics).
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budget director Alice Rivlin, and national economic council (NEC) director
Robert Rubin – insisted that deﬁcit reduction was essential to bring down long-
term interest rates and generate strong economic recovery. Aligned against them
were labour secretary Robert Reich, CEA chair Laura Tyson, NEC deputy di-
rector Gene Sperling, and the 1992 campaign consultants James Carville and
Paul Begala, who regarded the public investment programme as essential to
create jobs for and increase the wealth of Americans in the lower half of the
income distribution.64 The deﬁcit hawks won the argument because Clinton
heeded their claims that the Wall Street bond market and foreign investment in
dollar-denominated bonds would react positively to deﬁcit reduction. The voice
of former Goldman Sachs investment bank co-chair Robert Rubin was especially
inﬂuential in tutoring the president that a sound ﬁscal policy was essential to the
well being of America’s economy in view of the increasing globalization and
integration of ﬁnancial markets. As Laura Tyson later acknowledged, ‘At that
point, it was very important that he could say that based on his own [Wall Street]
experience. ’ For his part, Rubin later commented that historians would come to
regard Clinton as ‘ the ﬁrst American President with a deep understanding of how
these issues were reshaping our economy, our country, and the world ’.65
The ﬁve-year budget plan that became the core of the administration’s econ-
omic recovery programme projected a net deﬁcit reduction of $473 billion. It also
proposed an aggregate increase in investment spending of $153 billion, but the
portion of this devoted to new commitments was far lower than Reich and his allies
wanted and was mainly back-loaded at the end of the cycle. However, the White
House had failed to take into account the ﬁve-year caps on discretionary spending
mandated by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. Largely devised by
the Democratic congressional leadership and reluctantly signed by President
George Bush, this measure had originally been intended to compel defence re-
trenchment, but congressional budgeters now automatically applied its caps to the
investment expenditures. Having emphasized the absolute priority of deﬁcit re-
duction, Clinton was consequently in no position to call for the spending caps to be
raised from his investment programme for fear that this would legitimize
Republican attacks on the tax increases in his ﬁscal plan. A disconsolate Robert
Reich complained that the deﬁcit reduction plan as ﬁnally enacted oﬀered only ‘a
tiny morsel ’, barely $7 billion in total for ﬁscal 1994 and 1995, for new public
investment. In his view, the administration had created a ‘conceptual prison’ for
itself through its insistence that the essential elixir for economic revitalization was
reduced government borrowing, ‘ regardless of what the borrowing is for ’.66
64 The dispute is chronicled in Woodward, The agenda, pp. 80–133.
65 Tyson quoted in John Judis, ‘Old master: Robert Rubin’s artful role ’, New Republic, 13 Dec. 1993,
p. 21; Robert E. Rubin and Jacob Weisberg, In an uncertain world : tough choices from Wall Street to
Washington (New York, 2003), p. 121.
66 Ippolito, Why budgets matter, pp. 258–65; Reich, Locked in the cabinet, p. 119. For an interesting
comparison of ‘new Democrat’ and ‘new Labour’ deﬁcit reduction, see Ravi K. Roy and Arthur T.
Denzau, Fiscal policy convergence from Reagan to Blair : the left veers right (London, 2004), pp. 71–101.
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The outcome of the debate within the Clinton administration over economic
priorities signiﬁed that the evolution of the new Democratic economics was nearly
complete. First, it reaﬃrmed the orthodoxy of the supply-side approach that had
emerged in the Carter era. This was not a dispute between Keynesians and
conservatives about economic stimulus but between competing supply-side ideas
to boost productivity. The public investors wanted to make labour more pro-
ductive through increased spending on education and infrastructure, while the
priority of the deﬁcit hawks was to make capital cheaper and more productive
through shifting it from government to private hands by means of reduced public
borrowing. Secondly, it marked the resolution of the implicit contradiction in the
ﬁnal manifestation of Carter economics in 1980 between budget-balancing and
monetary restraint to reassure the bond market about Democratic determination
to control inﬂation and the emergent industrial policy strategy that allocated a
more positive social purpose for the state in deﬁning the nation’s economic
course. A Democratic administration had now tied its economic prospects un-
ambiguously to the conﬁdence of Wall Street in its capacity to cut the deﬁcit.
Clinton accepted this as economically necessary but was far from enthusiastic
about its political implications. ‘ I hope you’re all aware we’re all Eisenhower
Republicans ’, he railed sarcastically in one White House economic policy meet-
ing, ‘We’re Eisenhower Republicans here, and we are ﬁghting the Reagan
Republicans. We stand for lower deﬁcits and free trade and the bond market.
Isn’t that great? ’67
The prioritization of deﬁcit reduction also conﬁrmed the primacy of the federal
reserve in the new Democratic economics. In contrast to the Carter–Volcker
relationship, Clinton found himself dealing with a Republican appointee, Alan
Greenspan, who had previously served as chair of the Ford administration CEA
and economic adviser in the 1980 Reagan campaign. At their ﬁrst meeting, in
Little Rock on 2 December 1992, the fed chair helped to persuade the president-
elect that deﬁcit reduction was necessary for three reasons: the inﬂation excesses
of the 1970s still conditioned the inﬂationary expectations of the 1990s ; the
greatest contribution to economic growth would be a drop in long-term interest
rates ; but the gap between the now relatively low short-term rate and the corre-
spondingly high long-term rate represented an inﬂation premium levied by the
ﬁnancial markets because they assumed that an exploding deﬁcit would bring
renewed inﬂation and devalue their investments. Clinton’s openness to this
message convinced Greenspan that he was serious about his new Democrat
credentials. In turn, Clinton appreciated that Greenspan had not ruled out tax
increases as a means to cut the deﬁcit. ‘We can do business ’, he told Al Gore after
the meeting.68
Recognizing Greenspan’s immense inﬂuence with the ﬁnancial community,
Clinton hitched his administration’s economic policy to the federal reserve chair
even more ﬁrmly than Jimmy Carter had done to Volcker. Indeed Greenspan
67 Quoted in Woodward, The agenda, p. 165. 68 Ibid., pp. 68–71.
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enjoyed more inﬂuence with Clinton than with the two Republican
presidents – Reagan and George Bush Sr – who had respectively appointed and
re-appointed him. Clinton’s re-appointment of Greenspan to two further terms in
oﬃce in 1996 and 2000 underlined their co-operative relationship. As Laura
Tyson told one reporter, the Clinton economic team by 1996 thought of
Greenspan as one of them because he ‘wasn’t running the Fed as a
Republican’.69
In early 1993 Clinton’s advisers consulted Greenspan over the scale of deﬁcit
reduction and accepted his argument that an ambitious target would produce
interest rate changes whose beneﬁts would more than oﬀset the contractional
economic eﬀects of budgetary retrenchment.70 In turn the president used
Greenspan to legitimize his deﬁcit reduction plan against Republican criticism
that it was to be achieved in almost equal measure through tax increases and
spending cuts, instead of just the latter. As one analyst has noted, ‘The central
budget battle of the 1990s – whether to balance the budget at high- or low-
revenue levels – was won by Clinton and congressional Democrats, and their
victory carried over to spending policy. ’71 When Clinton announced his proposals
to congress on 17 February, Greenspan found himself seated in the front row of
the gallery between Hillary Clinton and Tipper Gore. As well as being seen on
television applauding the speech, he testiﬁed two days later before the senate
banking committee that the Clinton plan was ‘ serious ’ and ‘credible ’, support
that made newspaper headlines.72
By contrast, there was tension between the White House and the fed over
economic ﬁne-tuning. Clinton’s hope that deﬁcit reduction was suﬃcient in-
surance against inﬂation ran counter to Greenspan’s determination to reinforce
this with monetary restraint. In a twelve-month period beginning in February
1994, the federal reserve raised its short-term funds rate in seven consecutive hikes
from 3 per cent to 6 per cent to ensure that recovery did not destabilize prices.
‘Monetary policy which fails to focus on the long-term requirement of achieving
price stability ’, Greenspan declared, ‘ is inevitably going to ﬁnd itself in a position
where inﬂation emerges. ’73 Though not as draconian as Volcker’s approach, his
rate increases were undertaken at a time when inﬂation was below 3 per cent and
unemployment exceeded 6 per cent of the labour force, a level not substantially
lower than at the peak of the 1992 recession. Signiﬁcantly, 54 per cent of
respondents told the New York Times/CBS tracking poll in 1994 that the economy
was the nation’s most important problem, the highest level since 1980. The slow
pace of economic recovery played its part in the Republican capture of both
69 Bob Woodward, Maestro : Greenspan’s fed and the American boom (New York, 2000), p. 159. Robert
Reich, whose importance waned after the public investment defeat, records his dissenting view in
Locked in the cabinet, esp. pp. 78–82, 333–4.
70 Woodward, Maestro, pp. 98–101; Rubin and Weisberg, In an uncertain world, p. 120.
71 Ippolito, Why budgets matter, p. 288.
72 ‘Clinton’s program gets endorsement of fed’s chairman’, New York Times, 20 Feb. 1993.
73 David Wessel, ‘Blinder denies there’s a rift with fed chair ’, Wall Street Journal, 9 Sept. 1994, p. 2.
T H E N EW D EMOCR A T I C E CO NOM I C S 1033
houses of congress in 1994 and made the president anxious about his reelection
prospects.74
Although Clinton wanted greater emphasis on employment growth, he could
not aﬀord a public confrontation with Greenspan. As Laura Tyson put it, ‘We
decided early on that the ﬁnancial markets could misinterpret criticism of the Fed.
And the Fed itself might react in unpredictable ways. ’75 When new White House
chief of staﬀ Leon Panetta unilaterally broke ranks by calling for lower interest
rates during an appearance on NBC’s Meet the press in June 1995, he earned a
public rebuke from new treasury secretary Robert Rubin and private criticism
from Clinton.76 The president instead sought to inﬂuence monetary policy by
nominating economists who were Democratic sympathizers in place of
Republican appointees on the federal reserve’s seven-person board of governors.
This strategy was ﬁrst tested through the appointment of Yale’s Alan Blinder
as vice chair and Berkeley’s Janet Yellen as governor in June 1994. However,
the outcome served only to conﬁrm Greenspan’s ascendancy in the domain of
macroeconomic management.
Though Blinder had a reputation as a hard-headed Keynesian, who had sup-
ported deﬁcit reduction as a member of Clinton’s CEA, he had in earlier writings
warned against hysteria over inﬂation, an economic problem he adjudged was
more akin to a head cold than a serious disease. When appraised by an aide that
Blinder was no communist but was by fed standards soft on inﬂation, Greenspan
reportedly quipped, ‘ I would have preferred he were a Communist. ’77 But their
incipient power struggle over monetary policy was quickly settled by the hostile
reaction to an address given by Blinder at the Kansas City federal reserve’s Jackson
Hole conference in August 1994. The vice chair proposed that monetary policy
should have a short-term employment objective as well as an inﬂation objective; in
other words it should promote employment up to the point at which inﬂation
started to accelerate. The responding ﬁrestorm of criticism from both American
and foreign central bankers, Wall Street, and ﬁnancial journalists isolated Blinder
and fortiﬁed Greenspan’s dominance over monetary decisionmaking.78
Blinder quit the Federal Reserve in early 1996, occasioning media speculation
that he did not wish to serve in what had eﬀectively become a ceremonial post.79
In reality, Greenspan had by then moved of his own volition to adopt the position
74 Tatalovich and Frendreis, ‘Clinton, class and economic policy’, p. 43.
75 Quoted in David Rosenbaum and Steve Lohr, ‘With a stable economy, Clinton hopes for
credit ’, New York Times, 3 Aug. 1996, p. 8.
76 Dean Foust, ‘ In a ﬁx at the fed’, Business Week, 26 June 1995, p. 34. For Rubin’s public
statement, see Clay Chandler, ‘Panetta urges fed to cut short-term interest rates’, Washington Post,
12 June 1995, p. 6.
77 Alan S. Blinder, Hard heads, soft hearts : tough-minded economics for a just society (Reading, MA, 1987),
esp. ch. 2; Woodward, Maestro, p. 127.
78 David Wessel, ‘Central bankers say: look elsewhere on jobs’, Wall Street Journal, 29 Aug. 1994,
p. 1 ; Keith Bradsher, ‘A split over fed’s role ’, New York Times ’, 29 Aug. 1994, p. D1; Robert J.
Samuelson, ‘Economic amnesia: Alan Blinder forgets the dangers of inﬂation’, Newsweek, 13 Sept.
1994, p. 52. 79 John Cassidy, ‘Fleeing the fed’, New Yorker, 19 Feb. 1996, pp. 76–7.
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advocated by his vice chair. As Blinder and Janet Yellen later observed, while
Greenspan never endorsed the concept of a non-accelerating inﬂation rate of
unemployment, his strategy from mid-1995 to mid-1999 indicated that ‘ [monet-
ary] ﬁne tuning is at least possible ’.80 According to one biographer, Greenspan had
‘never been rule driven or theory driven’ and responded above all to the econ-
omic data. To some critics, this judgement glossed over Greenspan’s small-
government bias, evidenced by his insistence on deﬁcit reduction in 1993 and his
support of George W. Bush’s tax cut in 2001 to soak up the projected budget
surplus lest this set oﬀ a new round of federal spending.81 Nevertheless his em-
piricism was more evident in the second half of the 1990s.
Greenspan’s monitoring of economic data revealed a signiﬁcant slowdown in
recovery in the ﬁrst half of 1995, so in July he led the federal reserve into the ﬁrst
of a series of rate reductions that produced a ‘soft landing’ for the economy
instead of recession. Meanwhile long-term interest rates were also coming down,
so fulﬁlling the expectation underlying the 1993 deﬁcit reduction plan. Greenspan
kept the federal funds interest rate low for the next four years. A 0.25 per cent hike
in early 1997, a direct response to a brief spurt of inﬂation above 3 per cent in the
last quarter of 1996, was the sole exception to this trend. This was more than
counterbalanced by a series of rate reductions in late 1998 and early 1999 to
sustain investor and consumer conﬁdence against the spread of international
ﬁnancial crisis from East Asia and Russia. However the steady climb of inﬂation
from under 2 per cent in 1998 to above 3 per cent by mid-1999 induced
Greenspan to levy a new series of rate increases which pushed the federal funds
interest to the highest level in ten years over the next twelve months, a tightening
that critics dubbed as excessive.
Aided by a benign monetary regime, the United States entered one of the most
remarkable periods of economic expansion in its history from 1996 to 2000. The
unemployment rate fell from 5.6 per cent to 4 per cent, while inﬂation kept on the
lowest track since the 1950s. Most encouragingly, after a prolonged period of
sluggish growth averaging only 1.4 per cent annually between 1973 and 1995,
labour productivity increased at an annual rate of 2.7 per cent. While the causes
of this remain a matter of dispute among economists, Greenspan was one of many
analysts who placed great store on the inﬂuence of new technology. Though too
cautious to join the throng of corporate executives and media commentators who
proclaimed the existence of a ‘new economy’ driven by computers, the internet,
well-functioning venture capital markets, and globalization, he was seemingly
willing to accept the paradigm that employment could rise without fuelling
inﬂation in an environment of growing labour productivity.82
80 Alan S. Blinder and Janet L. Yellen, The fabulous decade : macroeconomic lessons from the 1990s
(New York, 2002), p. 85.
81 Woodward, Maestro, p. 227; Joseph Stiglitz, The roaring nineties : seeds of destruction (London, 2003),
pp. 79–80.
82 Woodward, Maestro, pp. 166–78. Michael Mandel and others, ‘How long can this last? ’ Business
Week, 19 May 1997, pp. 29–34, exempliﬁes media explanation of the late 1990s boom as the product of
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This economic success helped to reelect Clinton in 1996 and to save him
from impeachment over the Monica Lewinsky scandal.83 However, this did
not necessarily signify that his administration had discovered a new formula
to underwrite long-term Democratic economic and political success akin to
Keynesianism. The belief that private investment would respond positively to
interest rates was an article of faith for the Clinton administration but it was not
an iron rule for the markets. In contrast to the experience of the second half of the
1990s, lower interest rates did not boost investment in the 1991 recession nor when
the economy experienced another downturn in 2001. Another danger of over
reliance on Wall Street became apparent as the stock market boom turned into a
bubble that would eventually burst and plunge the nation into recession shortly
after Clinton left oﬃce. As Joseph Stiglitz, Clinton’s second CEA chair, later
commented, ‘We had put ourselves at the mercy of the mercurial bond markets,
those same people who at times exhibited irrational exuberance, and at others
irrational pessimism. ’84
The reduction in long-term interest rates helped make the stock market
more attractive than the bond market to investors. Since the White House
considered a bull market to be a badge of honour for a Democratic admin-
istration, it was in no position to speak out as the Dow Jones industrial index
rose from 5,000 to over 6,500 in 1996. Indeed, Robert Rubin had to dissuade
Clinton from agreeing to ring the bell at the New York stock exchange be-
cause of the damage to his reputation if the market went down.85 Green-
span was better placed to prick the bubble early on, but conﬁned himself to
rhetorical warnings – notably his famous comment in December 1996 about
‘ irrational exuberance’ unduly inﬂating asset values – that proved ineﬀective.
Over the next three years the Dow Jones index surged beyond 10,000 points.
Probably the strongest instrument of restraint at the fed’s disposal was its
power to raise margin requirements, which governed how much stock could
be bought with borrowed money. Greenspan told the federal reserve board
meeting of 24 September 1996 that this action would certainly douse the stock
market, but he worried that the entire economy would be dragged down in
consequence. ‘My concern’, he admitted, ‘ is that I am not sure what else it
will do. ’86
a ‘new economy’. For diﬀering academic perspectives, see Stephen D. Oliner and Daniel Sichel, ‘The
resurgence of growth in the late 1990s: is information technology the story? ’, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 14 (2000), pp. 3–22; and Robert J. Gordon, ‘Does the new economy measure up to the
great inventions of the past? ’, ibid., pp. 49–74.
83 Robert Busby, Defending the American presidency : Clinton and the Lewinsky scandal (London, 2001),
pp. 203, 223. 84 Stiglitz, The roaring nineties, p. 42.
85 Woodward, Maestro, p. 179. For the stock market boom, see Robert Shiller, Irrational exuberance
(Princeton, 2000), and Robert Brenner, The boom and the bubble : the US in the world economy (New York,
2002).
86 Minutes of the federal reserve open market committee meeting, 24 Sept. 1996, p. 31, www.
federalreserve.gov//transcripts/1996/19960924meeting.pdf.
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In the late 1990s Greenspan became the subject of hyperbolic media adulation
as the author of the boom.87 Of course, economic success was a complex process
that could not be credited to a single individual or institution. The Clinton ad-
ministration also assisted in a number of ways that built upon the new supply-side
emphasis of Democratic political economy. These included the earned income
tax credit (which cut the eﬀective tax rate paid by families in the bottom quintile
of the income distribution to the lowest level since the 1970s), raising the mini-
mum wage, the partial overhaul of the New Deal farm support system to enhance
the competitiveness of American farming (in co-operation with the Republican
congress), beeﬁng up the national labour relations board with pro-union ap-
pointees, and education initiatives like tuition tax cuts and credits. The adminis-
tration itself postulated deﬁcit reduction as its main contribution to the economy’s
well being, but the political and economic beneﬁts of this may not have been as
great as once thought.
A case can be made that the Clinton administration pushed deﬁcit reduction
too far. Cyclical ﬂuctuations have been historically characteristic of America’s
market economy – every boom has petered out and every recession was followed
by recovery. The economy would have recovered from the 1991 recession even if
the 1993 deﬁcit reduction plan had been smaller in scope. Arguably it was the real
changes in the economy – weaker unions, greater international competition,
higher productivity – that constituted the principal agency of growth. In that case
the economy would have performed even better had Clinton carried through his
public investment plans. The notion that deﬁcit reduction was essential for
economic growth also contradicted his administration’s eﬀorts to persuade the
governments of Japan and western Europe to stimulate their stagnant economies
by means of expansionary ﬁscal and monetary policies. As Joseph Stiglitz con-
tended, ‘[U]nless we understand how to think about deﬁcits, economic policies in
the future will be distorted – and economic prosperity will be at risk. ’88
The transformation in the attitude of both political parties to balanced budgets
since the 1970s was also signiﬁcant. Under Ronald Reagan and GeorgeW. Bush Jr
the Republicans reaped the political beneﬁts of identifying themselves as the party
of low taxes, even at the cost of sacriﬁcing ﬁscal integrity. By contrast the
Democrats have gained little political advantage from adopting the former
Republican symbol of balanced budgets, which has made it more diﬃcult for them
to fulﬁl their historicmission. ‘If theDemocratic party stands for anything ’, Robert
Reich avowed, ‘ it’s the simple proposition that prosperity should be shared. ’89
87 See, for example, the editorial ‘Who needs gold when we have Greenspan?’, New York Times,
4 Mar. 1999, p. 30. An editorial in the same paper on Greenspan’s reappointment was only marginally
less eﬀusive in declaring he was ‘more responsible for the economy’s spectacular performance
than … any other identiﬁable factor ’. See ‘Another term for Mr Greenspan’, ibid., 5 Jan. 2000, p. 24.
88 Stiglitz, The roaring nineties, pp. 41–55 (quotation p. 49). For a defence of deﬁcit reduction by other
former members of the administration, see Blinder and Yellen, The fabulous decade, pp. 15–24, 83–5, and
Rubin and Weisberg, In an uncertain world, pp. 353–71.
89 Reich, Locked in the cabinet, p. 318.
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With the mitigating role of the state in retreat because of domestic spending
retrenchment, the trend of growing income inequality that had emerged in the
1970s continued in the 1990s. Real median family income, which did not exceed
its 1989 level until 1998, stagnated for most of the Clinton era. Workers with
only a high school education or less beneﬁted least from the boom. Women
experienced a decline in the rate of improvement in their earnings ratio to
men – the annual income of full-time female workers was 73 per cent that of
men in 1998 compared with just over 71 per cent in 1992. The African-
American male to white male median income ratio improved from 61 per cent
in 1992 to 70 per cent in 1998 but more than half this gain took place in 1992–3,
well before the boom. Moreover, despite the boom, the unemployment rate of
8.2 per cent among black men was more than double that of 3.6 per cent
among white males in 1999. Meanwhile African-American female full-time
workers experienced a decline in their earnings relative to white females from 91
per cent in 1992 to 87 per cent in 1998. According to the liberal think tank, the
centre on budget and policy priorities, the lowest quintile’s share of aggregate
household income dropped 12 per cent while the highest income quintile in-
creased its share by 38.2 per cent between 1977 and 1999. It was true that the
poverty rate declined steadily from 15.1 per cent of the population in 1993 to
11.8 per cent in 1999, the lowest level since 1979, but this was not signiﬁcantly
better than the poverty rate of 12.8 per cent at the end of the Reagan era in
1989.90 Even Greenspan acknowledged that the fruits of prosperity had fallen
unevenly. ‘Expansion of income and wealth has been truly impressive ’, he de-
clared in his Harvard commencement address of 1999, ‘ though regrettably the
gains have not been as widely spread across households as I would like. ’ For a
member of the Democratic party’s old liberal intelligentsia, James MacGregor
Burns, the ‘grotesque income gap’ between rich and poor was testimony to the
inadequacy of Clinton–Gore centrism.91
Building on the foundations laid by Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton appeared to
have concocted an eclectic political economy that was a viable substitute for the
old Democratic economics. Everything that Carter had aspired to achieve, he
had seemingly been able to deliver. Inﬂation had been conquered, high em-
ployment was once more the norm, and productivity growth hit levels not seen
since the 1960s. Even the ﬁscal crisis that had been brewing in the 1970s and had
boiled over in the 1980s had apparently been resolved. In 1998 Clinton became
the sole Democratic president excepting Harry Truman to sign oﬀ a balanced
90 Economic report of the president 1999, p. 166; Economic report of the president 2000, pp. 342, 352, 354;
David Johnston, ‘Gap between rich and poor found substantially wider ’, New York Times, 5 Sept. 1999,
p. 14 ; Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn, ‘Gender diﬀerences in pay’, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 14 (2000), pp. 75–99; Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and John Schmitt, The state of
working America, 2000–2001 (Ithaca, NY, 2001).
91 Pamela Ferdinand and Michael Grunwald, ‘At two commencements, perspective is the reality ’,
Washington Post, 11 June 1999, p. 3 ; James MacGregor Burns and Georgia Sorenson, Dead center :
Clinton–Gore leadership and the perils of moderation (New York, 1999), p. 338.
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budget since modern ﬁscal procedures were established by the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921. With healthy surpluses projected into the ﬁrst decade of
the new century, he was optimistic that the Democrats could invest this ﬁscal
dividend to address the inequalities that the 1990s boom had failed to redress.
‘F.D.R.’s mission was to save capitalism from its own excesses ’, Clinton re-
portedly told his chief speechwriter, Jacob Weisberg, ‘Our mission has been to
save government from its own excesses so it can again be a progressive force. ’92
Such optimism that the American economy could be managed over the long
haul to eliminate serious cyclical ﬂuctuation and deliver bountiful revenue sur-
pluses for government has proved to be misplaced. The recession of 2001 dem-
onstrated that the so-called ‘new economy’ remained vulnerable to old-fashioned
business cycles. Moreover, the downturn’s depressing eﬀects on federal revenues
in combination with the massive expansion of national and homeland security
expenditure in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Bush tax cut have
generated a new era of huge deﬁcits. If the Carter political economy was unable
to overcome the limits of the 1970s, the Clinton political economy failed to tran-
scend the bubble economy of the late 1990s and to spread the beneﬁts of econ-
omic growth throughout American society. Bill Clinton may have completed the
transformation of Democratic economic governance started by Jimmy Carter,
but it is doubtful that their project can survive intact. If the Democrats do regain
the White House in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the ingenuity and
creativity of the new administration will need to be applied to learn from the
economic shortcomings as well as the successes of its two predecessors.
92 Quoted by Jacob Weisberg, ‘The governor-president’, New York Times Magazine, 17 Jan. 1999,
p. 33. Robert Rubin records a similar comment by Clinton during deliberations over the ﬁscal 1996
budget plan, the ﬁrst after the loss of control of congress to the Republicans : ‘ If I’m going to get heard
on anything else, I ﬁrst have to show a balanced budget. Once I do that I can talk about progressive
programs. But if I don’t show a balanced budget, they’ll never listen to me about progressive pro-
grams. ’ See In an uncertain world, p. 164.
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